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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
1-The courts may hold that a partner engaged in manual labor
is an employee and, therefore, entitled to compensation. The courts
of Oklahoma in the case of Ohio Drilling Co. v. State Industrial
Commission 57 adopted this method. In that case, all work was done
by the members of the partnership, who, because it was a hazardous
enterprise, insured themselves. The suit was brought by an injured
partner when the carrier refused compensation on the ground that
he was not an employee, but one of the employers. The court held
that a partner could be an employee, and compensation was awarded.
2-A statute may be passed making a workman who receives
wages an employee. Such a statute has been passed in California in
1937. It provides "A working member of a partnership receiving
wages irrespective of profits from such partnership is an employee
under this division." 58 The next section reads-"Workmen asso-
ciating themselves under a partnership agreement, the principal pur-
pose of which is the performance of the labor on a particular piece
of work are employees of the person having the work executed. In
respect to injuries which occur while such workmen maintain in
force insurance in an insurer, insuring to themselves and all persons
employed by them benefits identical with those conferred by this divi-
sion the person for whom such work is to be done is not liable as
an employer under this division." 59
3-A statute may extend the benefits of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act to the working members of a partnership without call-
ing them employees.
But under the law as it stands in New York today if the part-
nership is such as to comply with Section 10 of the Partnership Law
it will be upheld even though the avowed motive for its formation is
to evade the Workmen's Compensation Act.60
HUGH PETER MULLEN.
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES.
One of the most cherished attributes of our democratic society is
the right of trial by jury. No less important are the incidents thereto,
as for example, the selection and qualifications of the jurymen. Long
regulated by constitutional and statutory provisions, these rights have
become a bulwark of our system of government.
The following discussion is concerned with one of the elements
of trial practice which has assumed increasing importance, namely, the
57 86 Okla. 139 207 Pac. 314 (1922).
58 CAL. LABOR CODE § 3359.
59 Id. § 3360.
80 People v. Kaplan, 160 Misc. 179, 288 N. Y. Supp. 474 (1936).
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right to disqualify jurors for purely capricious objections; the right of
peremptory challenge.
A challenge is an objection to a juror. Objections may be made
to the whole panel of jurors, which is called a challenge to the array,
or a challenge may be made as to the individual juror, which is a
challenge to the polls. A challenge to the individual juror may be
for cause, or may be a peremptory challenge. A challenge for cause
is either a challenge for principal cause, in which case the juror is
disqualified as a matter of law, or a challenge to the favor, which
raises a question of fact.
2
A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror based upon the
whim or fancy of the challenger.3 He may object to the color of the
juror's hair or the cut of his suit and so disqualify him from serving.
This right, today, is purely statutory. It is evident that it is a sub-
stantial right, for once the legislature has decreed a definite number of
challenges no arbitrary rule of court can reduce that number.4
Peremptory Challenges in Civil Cases.
The right of peremptory challenge in New York has been granted
in both civil and criminal cases.5 At common law no right of peremp-
tory challenge in civil cases existed.6 The New York Civil Practice
Act now provides: 7 "Upon the trial of an issue of fact, joined in a
civil action in a court of record, each party may peremptorily challenge
not more than six and in a court not of record each party may peremp-
torily challenge not more than three of the persons drawn as jurors."
Thus the statute gives each party in a civil case at most six peremptory
challenges and not less than three.
The New York Civil Practice Act has also provided for alternate
jurors when the trial is likely to be protracted.$ The court, in its
discretion, may direct the calling of one or two additional jurors.
'See generally N. Y. Civ. PRac. AcT §§ 449a-453; N. Y. CoD CRmI.
PRoc. §§ 359-357; FFD. RuLEs or Civ. Pnoc. (1938) Rule 47; JuD. CODE § 287,
36 STAT. 1166 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 424 (1934).
2 Butler v. Glenn Falls R. R., 121 N. Y. 112, 24 N. E. 187 (1890).
3 N. Y. CoDE Cant. PRoc. § 372; People v. McGonega, 136 N. Y. 62,
32 N. E. 616 (1892) ; People v. Hughes, 137 N. Y. 29, 32 N. E. 1105 (1893) ;
People v. McQuade, 110 N. Y. 284, 18 N. E. 156 (1888) ; People v. Bodine, 1
Denio 281 (N. Y. 1845); People v. Elliott, 66 App. Div. 179, 73 N. Y. Supp.
282 (3d Dept. 1901).
4 People v. McQuade, 110 N. Y. 284, 18 N. E. 156 (1888); Betts v. United
States, 132 Fed. 228 (C. C. A. 1st, 1904) ; Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S.
370, 13 Sup. Ct. 136 (1892); Sorter v. Austen, 221 Ala. "481, 129 So. 51
(1930) ; Schnitzler v. Atchinson R. R., 104 Cal. App. 138, 285 Pac. 918 (1930) ;
Gordon v. Chicago, 201 Ill. 623, 66 N. E. 823 (1903); Foreman v. State, 203
Ind. 324, 180 N. E. 291 (1932) ; see Walter v. People, 32 N. Y. 147 (1865);
Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164 (1873).
5 N. Y. Civ. PpAc. AcT § 451; N. Y. CODE CRuM. PRoc. §§ 359, 372, 385, 386.
0 Sackett v. Ruder, 152 Mass. 397, 25 N. E. 736 (1890).
7N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 451.
8Id. § 499a.
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These jurors are to be " * * * drawn from the same source, and in the
same manner, and have the same qualifications as the jurors already
sworn and be subjected to the same examinations and challenges."
(Italics ours.) If before the termination of a case a juror dies or
becomes ill, the court may, in its discretion, substitute the alternate
juror. But even though two additional jurors may thus be chosen,
the Civil Practice Act has failed to provide for an increase in the
number of peremptory challenges.
There seems to be no logical reason for this omission. It has
been said that peremptory challenges are one of the most effective
means of ridding the jury box of unfit men.9 And both the New
York Code of Criminal Procedure 10 'and the new Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 11 have made specific provisions for additional per-
emptory challenges for alternate jurors. It is submitted that the pres-
ent provision of the Civil Practice Act should be amended to include
such a provision.
According to the wording of the statute, "each party" may per-
emptorily challenge. This has raised the frequently litigated question
as to the meaning of "each party" where there is more than one
plaintiff or defendant.
In Downey v. Finucane,12 a leading New York case, plaintiff
instituted an action of fraud and deceit against five defendants, claim-
ing they were liable for a false prospectus issued to promote the sale
of securities. The five defendants claimed that each of them was
entitled to six peremptory challenges. But the Court of Appeals only
allowed six peremptory challenges in all. The defendants were
treated collectively as one "party" because they had a common interest,
their answers were substantially identical, and their defenses were
conducted in the common interest of all. The word "each party" was
held not to mean each individual litigant, but, rather, each side to the
controversy. If there is no community of interest among the con-
testants and their claims are conflicting, each plaintiff and each defen-
dant will be entitled to his share of peremptory challenges. This situ-
ation is also present where cases are consolidated in the interest of
economy and justice.' 3
9 Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 7 Sup. Ct. 350 (1886).
:O0 N. Y. CODE CRIM. PRoC. § 373.
11 FEi. RULES CIV. PROC. (1938) Rule 47.
12205 N. Y. 251, 98 N. E. 391 (1912) ; Lane v. Fenn, 146 App. Div. 205,
130 N. Y. Supp. 995 (4th Dept. 1911).
13 For an interesting selection of cases on the question of whether the
litigants in an action are considered a "party" see note 12, supra; Eilola v.
Oliver Min. Co., 201 Minn. 77, 275 N. W. 408 (1937); Roberts v. Saunders,
118 N. J. L. 584, 194 Atl. 1 (1937); Edwards v. West Texas Hospital, 107
S. W. (2d) 729 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) ; Glazier v. Roberts, 108 S. W. (2d) 829(Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Kincaid v. Chi. R. R., 119 S. W. (2d) 1084 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1938). In Maddox v. Pattison, 186 So. 894 (La. 1939), a death action
resulting from injuries sustained in a collision was consolidated for trial with
another action by another party injured in the same collision. The consolidation
of the actions was for the purpose of economy and justice, since the same
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An interesting angle is presented in the case where the defendants
are joined because " * * * the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person
from whom he is entitled to redress * * *" and he seeks to question
them to see to what extent any of the defendants are liable.14 In such
a case, each defendant should be allowed his statutory number of
peremptory challenges. In Schultz v. Gilbert,15 a negligence action by
eight plaintiffs against one defendant, the court pointed out the possi-
bility that plaintiff may join with himself other parties as plaintiff
solely for the purpose of increasing the number of peremptory chal-
lenges, and hastened to add that this would be a fraud on the court.
In view of the New York decisions on the meaning of "each party"
this danger is less serious here.
Although the number of peremptory challenges are definite, they
may be increased or decreased by the legislature so long as the right
is not taken away.16 And the time, manner and order of exercising
these challenges are also regulated by the legislature, though the court
has a certain amount of discretion where the particular facts demand
action by the court.17 It is to be noted that the court has no right of
peremptory challenge.
Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Cases.
At common law, the crown long abused its right of peremptory
challenges in criminal cases. Its right of unlimited objections to any
number of jurors proved so distressing that in the reign of Edward I,
a statute was passed abolishing the crown's right of peremptory
challenge.'"
Since the questions of challenges are in the control of the legisla-
ture, we look to the New York Code of Criminal Procedure. 9 It
evidence was involved in both actions. The court held each plaintiff was entitled
to the statutory number of peremptory challenges. See Levyin v. Kopin, 183
Mich. 232, 149 N. W. 993 (1914); International R. R. v. Bingham, 40 Tex.
Civ. App. 469, 89 S. W. 1113 (1905) ; notes 30, 33, infra.
14 N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 213: "Where the plaintiff is in doubt as to the
person from whom he is entitled to redress, he may join two or more defen-
dants, to the intent that the question as to which, if any, of the defendants, is
liable and to what extent, may be determined between the parties."
15 20 N. E. (2d) 884 (Ill. 1939).
16 Walter v. People, 32 N. Y. 147 (1865) ; Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164
(1873).
17 See note 23, infra. The N. Y. CoDE CRam. PRoc. § 371 provides: "A
challenge must be taken when the juror appears, and before he is sworn; but
the court may, in its discretion, for good cause, set aside a juror at any time
before evidence is given in the action."
28 33 ED. I. c. 4. At common law the right of peremptory challenge existed
only in capital cases, cases punishable by death. See United States v. Carrigo,
25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,735 (1802) ; People v. Keating, 61 Hun 260, 16 N. Y. Supp.
748 (5th Dept. 1891). Peremptory challenges were allowed only on the plea of
not guilty, and never on the trial of collateral issues. People v. Reese, 258
N. Y. 89, 179 N. E. 305 (1932) ; Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9 (N. Y. 1847);
People v. Aichman, 7 How. Pr. 241 (N. Y. 1852).
1) N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 359-387; particularly § 373; see note 16, supra.
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provides: "If the crime charged be punishable with death, thirty
[peremptory challenges are allowed] for the regular jury; and three
for each alternate juror; if punishable with imprisonment for life, or
for a term of ten years or more, twenty [peremptory challenges are
allowed] for the regular jury; and two for each alternate juror." In
all other cases, five challenges are allowed and one additional for each
alternate. The peremptory challenges for the alternate jurors are
computed separately and are in addition to the number of peremptory
challenges actually taken. 20
The Code of Criminal Procedure differs from the Civil Practice
Act with respect to peremptory challenges in two ways. The number
of peremptory challenges varies with the seriousness of the crime, and
provision is made for additional peremptory challenges for alternate
jurors.
An interesting case is People v. Reese.21 Defendant was con-
victed of forgery, but before sentence was imposed, the District Attor-
ney accused him of having been convicted of three crimes which would
have been felonies had they been committed in New York. Arraigned
in response to this information, the defendant stood mute. A jury
was impanelled to determine his identity and they found him to be the
same person who was previously convicted. Defendant was then sen-
tenced to imprisonment as a fourth offender. He claimed that the
refusal to allow him his peremptory challenges in this action was error.
The Court of Appeals held that " * * * for centuries the privilege of
such a challenge has been denied whenever the proceedings, though
triable by a jury, has been collateral to the general issue of the defen-
dant's guilt or innocence." 22 The present inquiry, in which the defen-
dant was found to be a fourth offender, was deemed collateral within
the old rule, and the defendant was not entitled to any peremptory
challenges.
We have seen that the legislature has the right of determining the
time and manner of choosing the jurors. Therefore, a requirement
that peremptory challenges be made before the juror is sworn is con-
stitutional.23 The courts, nevertheless, retain discretion to set aside a
juror any time before evidence is given. 24
20 Id. § 373.
21258 N. Y. 89, 179 N. E. 305 (1932).
22258 N. Y. 89, 103, 179 N. E. 305, 309 (1932).
23 People v. Elliott, 66 App. Div. 179, 73 N. Y. Supp. 279' (3d Dept. 1901),
aff'd, 172 N. Y. 146, 64 N. E. 837 (1902); People v. Thayer, 61 Misc. 573,
115 N. Y. Supp. 855 (1908), aff'd, 132 App. Div. 593, 116 N. Y. Supp. 821
(3d Dept. 1909). For cases in which the court allowed peremptory challenges
after the jurors were sworn, see People v. Carpenter, 102 N. Y. 238, 6 N. E.
584 (1885) ; People v. Hughes, 137 N. Y. 29, 32 N. E. 1105 (1893). On the
constitutionality of N. Y. CoDm Cm. PROC. §§ 369, 37,0, 371, see People v.
Mack, 35 App. Div. 114, 54 N. Y. Supp. 698 (3d Dept. 1898).
24 See note 22, supra; People v. Goodwin, 72 P. (2d) 551 (Cal. 1937);
State v. Ezell, 189 La. 151, 179 So. 64 (1938). It has been said that swearing
is begun as soon as the juror is directed to be sworn and has placed his hand
upon the book. State v. Deliso, 75 N. J. L. 808, 69 Atl. 218 (1908).
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The legislature has made a distinct provision for the order in
which challenges are to be taken in criminal cases. 25  One interesting
provision is that challenges to the individual juror must be taken first
by the people and then by the defendant.2 6 This section is mandatory
and any attempt by the court to vary the order is violative of the
defendant's constitutional rights.2 7  The order in which peremptory
challenges is exercised is more important than it seems. Let us
assume that one particular juror is so offensive that both the people
and the defendant would unhesitatingly peremptorily challenge him.
If the people must challenge first, the defendant has saved himself a
challenge and actually has received an additional one. Repeat this
instance with a number of jurors and we see that the order in which
peremptory challenges must be exercised has its advantages and dis-
advantages.
If several defendants are tried together, a statutory provision
prevents them from severing their challenges.2 8  So, where five per-
sons were tried together for murder in the first degree, they received
thirty peremptory challenges as if there were but one defendant 2 9
This follows the reasoning of the courts in civil cases holding that
"each party" means each side to the controversy3 0 Where, however,
two separate actions have been consolidated to speed up the wheels of
economy and justice, each defendant would be allowed the statutory
number of peremptory challenges.31
25 
. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §386. Order of Challenges:
"Challenges of either party must be taken:
1. To the panel.
2. To an individual juror, for a general disqualification.
3. To an individual juror, for implied bias.
4. To an individual juror, for actual bias.
5. Peremptory."2 6 N. Y. CoDn Cim. Paoc. § 385: "Challenges to an individual juror must
be taken first by the people and then by the defendant."
27 People v. McQuade, 110 N. Y. 284, 18 N. E. 156 (1888); People v.
McGonegal, 62 Hun 622, 17 N. Y. Supp. 147 (1st Dept. 1891), aff'd, 136 N. Y.
62, 32 N. E. 616 (1892). In People v. Grieco, 266 N. Y. 48, 193 N. E. 634
(1934), the court permitted the people to peremptorily excuse a juror who had
previously been examined and accepted not only by the people but by counsel
for the defendant. Upon appeal the court held this was error. In State v.
Ferguson, 187 La. 869, 175 So. 603 (1937), it was held that if the court makes
the defendant exercise his peremptory challenge first, it violates his constitutional
right.28 N. Y. CODE CaM. PRoc. § 360: "When several defendants are tried
together they cannot sever their challenges, but must join therein."
29 People v. Doran, 246 N. Y. 409, 159 N. E. 379 (1927).
30 See notes 12, 13, 14, 15, mipra.
31 People v. Kassis, 145 Misc. 483, 259 N. Y .Supp. 339 (1931); People v.
Schemnitzer, 142 Misc. 16, 254 N. Y. Supp. 480 (1932); People v. Vario, 165
Misc. 842, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 611 (1938); see People v. Casey, 96 N. Y. 115
(1884), note 13, .rpra, note 33, infra.
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Peremptory Challenges and Federal Practice.
Under Federal Practice,32 the rules respecting peremptory chal-
lenges follow, in general, the pattern of the state courts. Twenty
peremptory challenges are allowed to defendants upon an indictment
for treason or a capital offense, while the United States is allowed
six. In all other cases, whether civil or criminal, each party gets
three peremptory challenges. There is an express statutory provision
that in cases of several defendants or plaintiffs the parties on each side
shall be deemed a single party for the purpose of peremptory chal-
lenges.33 It is probable that if the interests of the joint parties were
adverse and in conflict, each litigant would be allowed the legal num-
ber of challenges. There are no federal cases on this point but the
attitude of the federal courts where two actions have been consolidated
lends some support to this supposition.3
4
Two points about Federal Practice that should be noted are the
provisions for peremptory challenges where alternate jurors are
chosen,3 5 and the fact that where a prisoner in a federal court is
indicted for murder he has no right to have the government exhaust
its peremptory challenges before him."
In all questions on time for challenging, and order of challenging,
32 FED. RULES CIv. PROC. (1938) Rule 47; JUD. CODE § 287, 36 STAT. 1166
(1911), 28 U. S. C. § 424 (1934) ; United States v. Hall, 44 Fed. 883 (W. D.
Ga. 1890).
33 JUD. CODE § 287, 36 STAT. 1166 (1911), 28 U. S. C. 424 (1934) : "When
the offense charged is treason or a capital offense, the defendant shall be entitled
to twenty and the United States to six peremptory challenges. On the trial of
any other felony, the defendant shall be entitled to ten and the United States to
six peremptory challenges; and in all other cases, civil and criminal, each party
shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges; and in all cases where there
are several defendants or several plaintiffs, the parties on each side shall be
deemed a single party for the purposes of all challenges under this section. * * *"
34 Davis v. Jessup, 2 F. (2d) 433 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924); Zedd v. United
States, 11 F. (2d) 96 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926); United Verde COpper Co. v.
Jordan, 14 F. (2d) 299 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926); MooPEs, FEDERAL PRACTIcE(1938) 3093. In Beckett v. United States, 84 F. (2d) 731 (C. C. A. 6th,
1936), where for the purpose of trial, an indictment charging the defendant
used the United States mails to defraud, was consolidated with an indictment
for conspiracy, which grew out of the same transaction, the court held the
defendant was not entitled to have the number of challenges allowed a defen-
dant in a criminal case, for each indictment on which the defendant was charged
in the consolidated action. See Avila v. United States, 76 F. (2d) 39 (C. C. A.
9th, 1935); Butler v. Evening Post Pub. CO., 148 Fed. 821 (C. C. A. 4th,
1906), cert. denied, 204 U. S. 670, 27 Sup. Ct. 785 (1907) ; People v. Schanda,
352 Ill. 36, 185 N. E. 183 (1933) ; Garton v. Powers, 252 Mich. 442, 233 N. W.
373 (1930); State v. Park, 322 Mo. 69, 16 S. W. (2d) 30 (1929).
35 FED. RULES Civ. PRoc. (1938) Rule 47: If one or two alternate jurors
are called, each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to
those otherwise allowed by law. This additional peremptory challenge may be
used only against alternate jurors and other peremptory challenges allowed by
law shall not be used as alternates.




the court retains the right to use its discretion to effectuate justice
where the facts warrant it.3t There is no penalty if the number of
peremptory challenges is exceeded by either of the parties, although,
at common law, this right was considered so important that if the
number of challenges was exceeded by the defendant the penalty was
death.38
Peremptory Challenges and Voir Dire Examinations.
Though the right of peremptory challenge may be exercised with-
out assigning any reason, and the challenger may base his objection
on pure intuition, it is frequently desirable to examine the juror. By
a voir dire examination one is able to see the juror, hear his answers,
and note his mannerisms under examination. Whether such an ex-
amination is a right or purely discretionary is debatable. There is no
doubt that it is desirable for it enables the challenger to use his right
of peremptory challenges more intelligently.39 Most courts allow
examinations of jurors even though it is merely to get information on
which to base their peremptory challenges. 40 New York allows such
examinations.4'
In the few jurisdictions which refuse to allow examinations solely
for the purpose of enabling a more intelligent use of the peremptory
challenge,42 resort is frequently had to personal investigations of the
jurors outside the court room. In Sinclair v. United States,43 detec-
tives were employed for the sole purpose of shadowing jurors and
then reporting on their activities. The Supreme Court condemned
this practice, rebuked the offenders, and held such practice in con-
tempt of court.
Under the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,44 the court may
permit the parties or their attorneys to conduct the examination of
prospective jurors, or the court may itself conduct the examination.
If the court conducts the examination, the rules provide that the court
shall permit the parties or their attorneys to supplement the examina-
37 Radford v. United States, 129 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 2d, 1904) ; Pointer v.
United States, 151 U. S. 396, 14 Sup. Ct. 410 (1894) ; (1936) 10 So. CALIF. L.
REv. 89.
38 35 C. J. (1924) p. 411, § 470, nn.36, 37.
39 Foreman v. State, 203 Ind. 324, 180 N. E. 291 (1932); State v. Toff's
Estate, 13 N. E. (2d) 883 (Ind. 1938); State v. Lauth, 46 Ore. 342, 80 Pac.
660 (1905) ; (1933) 17 MINN. L. REv. 299.
40 Raines v. Wilson, 213 Iowa 1251, 239 N. W. 36 (1932); Church v.
Stoldt, 215 Mich. 469, 184 N. W. 469 (1921); Wilkinson v. State, 120 Tex.
Cr. Rep. 284, 47 S. W. (2d) 819 (1932).
41 Dresch v. Elliott, 137 App. Div. 252, 122 N. Y. Supp. 14 (1st Dept.
1910).
42 People v. Edwards, 163 Cal. 752, 127 Pac. 58 (1912) ; People v. Eudy,
12 Cal. (2d) 359 (1938) ; State v. Welsh, 160 Md. 542, 154 Atl. 51 (1931).
43279 U. S. 749, 49 Sup. Ct. 471 (1929) ; see also Comm. v. Sherman, 264
Mass. 264, 162 N. E. 349 (1928).
44 FED. RULES CIV. PROC. (1938) Rule 47.
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tion by such further inquiry as it deems proper. The parties may
submit questions to the court, which the court in its discretion may
submit to the jurors. In many states the practice is to allow the
counsel to conduct the examination directly, always subject, however,
to the discretion of the court. No valid objection can be made to the
court's supervision in this matter, as the court is equally competent
arid, at times, more experienced in understanding the type of questions
that are prejudicial and the type of questions most likely to produce
the desirable results. Jurors who answer questions falsely are subject
to penalty. In People v. Rendigs, 45 the juror was under oath and
wilfully gave a false answer. He was held liable for perjury. If the
juror is not under oath, the penalty would be at least contempt of
court.
To tell accurately what type of question would be allowed upon a
voir dire examination is difficult. At best one can list the general
type of questions that have been acceptable.
In negligence cases, the question frequently asked of jurors is
their interest in insurance companies. This question is proper in
New York by statute.46  Where, however, plaintiff's counsel asked
jurors if they were interested in an insurance company which is
"defending this case" the court held it was an improper statement.17
Questions as to the jurors' views on the subject of capital punish-
ment; 48 his prejudices against certain defenses; 49 his prejudices
against certain classes of people or political or economic groups, have
been allowed. 50 In Aldrich v. United States,51 a negro who killed a
white man was held entitled to have jurors asked on their voir dire if
they had any racial prejudices which might prevent an impartial
verdict. In New York, where this question was answered in the
affirmative, it was held not error to reject the juror.52  And so ques-
45 123 Misc. 32, 205 N. Y. Supp. 133 (1924).
4 6 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 452; Wood v. N. Y. State Electric and Gas
Corp., 257 App. Div. 172 (3d Dept. 1939); Gelbo v. Findlay, 257 App. Div. 66
(4th Dept: 1939); Blair v. McCormack Constr. Co., 123 App. Div. 30, 107
N. Y. Supp. 750 (2d Dept. 1906), aff'd, 195 N. Y. 521 (1909). For an excel-
lent discussion of this problem see N. Y. L. J., July 6, 1939, p. 38, col. 1;
N. Y. L. J., July 5, 1939, p. 28, col. 1; (1933) 17 MINN. L. REv. 299.
47 Kolacki v. Am. Sugar Refining Co., 164 App. Div. 417, 150 N. Y. Supp.
93 (2d Dept. 1914); Gallotti v. Deansboro Supply Co., 248 App. Div. 20,
289 N. Y. Supp. 535 (3d Dept. 1936).
48 State v. Foster, 91 Iowa 164, 59 N. W. 8 (1894).
49 Towl v. Bradley, 108 Mich. 409, 66 N. W. 347 (1896).
50 See Notes (1936) 105 A. L. R. 1527; (1935) 95 A. L. R. 388; (1931)
73 A. L. R. 1208 on racial, religious, social or political prejudice of proposed
juror as proper subject of inquiry or ground of challenge on voir dire in
criminal cases.
51283 U. S. 308, 51 Sup. Ct. 470 (1931).
82 People v. Decker, 157 N. Y. 186, 51 N. E. 1018 (1898) ; Balbo v. People,
80 N. Y. 484 (1880) ; cf. People v. Christie, 2 Park. Cr. Rep. (N. Y.) 579,
2 Abb. Pr. 256 (1855).
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ions as to the juror's membership in the Ku Klux Klan; 53 or in an
organization for the prosecution of offenses such as that which the
defendant was charged, have also been held admissible.5 4
In all these cases it must be remembered that the nature of the
examination and the type of question is carefully scrutinized by the
court.mr In the interest of justice, and the more intelligent use of the
right of challenging, the courts should allow great freedom in these
examinations, and should hesitate to rule out a question unless it is
asked maliciously, without having any possible bearing on the prob-
lem, and would be a clear violation of some right of the juror.
ROBERT A. KLEix.
53 Fileppelli v. United States, 6 F. (2d) 121 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) ; Reich
v. State, 94 Tex. Cr. Rep. 449, 251 S. W. 1072 (1923) ; Benson v. State, 95
Tex. Cr. Rep. 311, 254 S. W. 793 (1923).
54 Lavin v. People, 69 Ill. 303 (1873); State v. Mulroy, 152 Minn. 423,
189 N. W. 441 (1922).
55 Bass v. Dehner, 103 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939) ; Roby v. State,
17 N. E. (2d) 800 (Ind. 1938) ; Kiesau v. Varigen, 285 N. W. 181 (Ind. 1939) ;
Hawkins y. Burton, 281 N. W. 342 (Iowa 1939) ; Petition of City of Detroit
to Condemn Lands, 280 Mich. 708, 274 N. W. 375 (1937). In prosecution
under a statute in New Jersey, for filing a Democratic Party nominating peti-
tion which the defendant knew was falsely made, questions relating to member-
ship in the Democratic Party, and the juror's participation in the Democratic
primary of that year were properly excluded in a voir dire examination. The
court said that because one was a member of the Democratic Party, or because
he participated in a primary, would not be evidence of bias or prejudice. State
v. Longo, 121 N. J. L. 427, 3 Atl. (2d) 127 (1939). Whether the court would
have denied these questions if the examina-tion was for the purpose of exercising
peremptory challenges is questionable.
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